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ABSTRACT 
This chapter deals with three question: 1) What are ‘subjective’ measure? 2) What is 
‘wellbeing’? and 3) Are subjective measures of wellbeing of use for policymaking, in particular 
in developing nations? 
The first question is answered by making a distinction between two kinds of ‘subjectivity’: 
subjective substance and subjective assessment. On that basis nine types of indicators are 
discerned, varying in degree of subjectivity. 
The second question is answered by discerning four kinds of wellbeing. Examples are 
presented of indicators for each of these wellbeing variants. It is argued that there is little sense 
in combining these variants in one sum-score of overall wellbeing, since this involves adding 
apples and oranges. The much-used Human Development Index is rejected on that ground. 
 In answer to the third question a case is made for subjective measures of wellbeing, in 
particular for using ‘happy life years’ as an indicator of final policy effectiveness. 
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‘happiness adjusted life years’. JEL classification: 131, 132, D19, D78 
 
There is a longstanding controversy in social indicators research between the 'objective' and the 
'subjective' approach. In the objective approach the focus is on measuring 'hard' facts, such as 
income in dollars or living accommodation in square meters. The subjective approach in contrast 
considers 'soft' matters such as satisfaction with income and perceived adequacy of dwelling. The 
objective approach roots in the tradition of social statistics, which dates back to the 19th century. 
The subjective approach stems from survey research, which took off in the 1960's. The objective 
approach is similar to mainstream economic indicators research, though the topics differ, the 
method is the same. The subjective approach is akin to the psychological stream found in 
economic indicators research, which monitors things like consumer trust (Katona, 1975) and 
subjective poverty (VanPraag et. al.1980). 
The subjective approach originates from the US. Landmark studies have been published 
by Campbell et al (1975) and by Andrews & Withey (1976). This approach is further refined in 
the German 'welfare studies' (Glatzer & Zapf 1984). Specializations have been developed on 
subjects such as perceived poverty (VanPraag et al 1980), values (Inglehart 1990) and happiness 
(Veenhoven 1997). 
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1          WHAT ARE 'SUBJECTIVE' MEASURES? 
 
At first sight, the distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' indicators is fairly clear. Yet 
when a closer look is taken there are two dimensions of difference.  
Firstly there is a difference in substance matter measured. Objective indicators are concerned 
with things, which exist independent of subjective awareness. For instance: someone can be ill in 
an objective sense, because a tumor is spreading in the body, without that person knowing. 
Likewise, Marxists maintain that workers are objectively underclass people, even if they see 
themselves rather as middle class. Both the doctor and the Marxist give more weight to the 
objective condition and will press for treatment even if the patient protests. 
 Secondly, there is a difference in assessment. Objective measurement is based on explicit 
criteria and performed by external observers. Illness can be measured objectively by the presence 
of antigens in the blood, and class membership by possession of means of production. Given 
these operational definitions, any impartial observer will come to the same conclusion. Yet 
subjective measurement involves self-reports based on implicit criteria. The ignorant cancer 
patient who reports to feel in good health may have based that appraisal on many cues and will 
not be really able to say how he came to that appraisal. The worker with false class-awareness 
fails to notice the whole point. 
These examples show that the differences in substance and measurement do not necessarily 
concur. The possible combinations are presented in scheme 1.  
 
The two top quadrants concern objective substance matters. The quadrant top left denotes the 
combination of objective substance and objective measurement. An example is the actual 'wealth' 
of a person when measured by her bank account. The top right quadrant also concerns objective 
substance, but now measured by self-estimate. An example is measuring wealth by perceived 
wealthiness.  
The two bottom quadrants in scheme 1 concern subjective matters, such as identity, 
happiness and trust. The bottom left quadrant combines subjective substance with objective 
measurement. An example is measuring happiness by suicide. The bottom right quadrant 
measures subjective substance using subjective appraisal, for instance, measuring happiness by 
self-report.    
 The shading indicates the degree of subjectivity in scheme 1, the darker the field, the 
more subjective the indicators it denotes. 
 
The reality of social indicators research is more complex than these two dichotomies suggest. The 
substance of indicators cannot always be classified as either 'objective' or 'subjective' and the 
methods of measurement do not always fit this dichotomy either. Insertion of a mixed category on 
both axes results in the 3 by 3 classification on scheme 2. The numbers in the cells reflect the 
position on the joined objective-subjective range, the higher the number, the more subjective this 
kind of indicator. 
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2         WHAT IS 'WELL-BEING'? 
 
The term 'well-being' denotes that something is in a good state. The term does not specify what 
that something is and neither what is considered 'good'. So, it is a typical catchall term without a 
precise meaning, like words such as 'progress' and 'welfare'. This notion can be specified in two 
ways: first by specifying the ‘what’ and secondly by spelling out the criteria of 'well'ness. 
 
2.1      Well-being of what? 
The term is used for social systems and for individual beings. This difference is often left implicit 
and used for suggesting that what is good for society is also good for citizens. The focus of this 
book is on 'human wellbeing' hence on the wellbeing of individuals. In that sense the term 
'wellbeing' is synonymous with 'quality-of-life'. 
 
2.2       What is being well? 
Sometimes, the term 'well-being' is used as a generic for all the good. Yet mostly, the word is 
used for specific varieties of goodness. The main meanings are presented in Scheme 3.  
 The classification of meanings in scheme 3 depends on two distinctions. Vertically there is a 
difference between chances for a good life and actual outcomes of life. Chances and outcomes are 
related, but are certainly not the same. This distinction is quite common in the field of public-health 
research. Pre-conditions for good health, such as adequate nutrition and professional care are seldom 
confused with health itself.  Yet means and ends are less well distinguished in the discussion on 
wellbeing.  
 Horizontally there is a distinction between external and internal states of being. In the first 
case the wellness is in the environment, in the latter it is in the individual. This distinction is also 
quite commonly made in public health. External pathogens are distinguished from inner afflictions, 
and researchers try to identify the mechanisms by which the formers produce the latter. Yet again 
this basic insight is lacking in many discussions about wellbeing.  
 Together, these two dichotomies mark four different concepts of wellbeing, which are 
explained below. 
 
Quality of the environment   
The left top quadrant denotes the meaning of good living conditions. Sociologists use the word 
'wellbeing' mostly in this sense. Economists sometimes use the term 'welfare' for this meaning. 
Ecologists and biologists also use the term 'livability' in this context, and then refer to the suitability 
of an environment for a particular species.    
 Politicians and social reformers typically stress this concept of wellbeing. In their use of the 
word they typically refer to pre-conceptions of what a good living environment is like, such as a 
good standard of living and social equality.  
 
Life-ability of the person  
The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we are equipped to cope with 
the problems of life. Psychologists typically use the word wellbeing in this sense. Also this variant is 
known by different names. In the medical profession this matter also called 'health' in the medium 
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variant of the word1. Biologists name it 'fitness'. Sen (1993) calls this variant of wellbeing 
'capability'.  
 This concept is central in the thinking of therapists and educators, the former associate the 
term with public health, the latter with schooling. 
 
Worth for the world 
The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be good for something more 
than it-self. This presumes some higher value, such as ecological preservation or cultural 
development. In fact, there is a myriad of values on which the worth of a life can be judged. There is 
no current generic for these external turnouts of life. Gerson (1976: 795) referred to these kinds as 
'transcendental' conceptions of wellbeing. Another appellation is 'meaning of life', which then 
denotes 'true' significance instead of mere subjective sense of meaning.  
 Moral advisors, such as your pastor, emphasize this kind of wellbeing.  
 
Enjoyment of life   
Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of life. That is the wellbeing in the 
eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious humans, this quality boils down to subjective 
appreciation of life. This is commonly referred to by terms such as 'satisfaction' and 'happiness'. 
 There is no professional interest group that stresses this meaning. Yet this concept is central 
in utilitarian moral philosophy, which seems to revive nowadays (Veenhoven 2003b). 
 
3          MEASURES OF WELLBEING 
 
Using the distinctions of schemes 2 and 3 I can now provide a systematic overview of measures 
of wellbeing. Below I will skirt along the quadrants of scheme 3 and consider for each of these 
concepts, which measurement methods of scheme 2 apply. Though the focus of this chapter is on 
subjective indicators, I will also mention objective indicators, since this helps to place the 
subjective ones in context. 
 
3.1        Indicators of quality of the environment 
Starting left on top of scheme 3 I begin with wellbeing in the sense of living in good conditions. 
How can that kind of wellbeing be measured? Substantially, this is an objective matter, since the 
environment is something that exists independent of personal perceptions. Following scheme 2 
we can then distinguish three measurement methods: type 1, 2 and 3. Below I will give examples 
of each of these. When considering the indicators used for measuring the quality of the 
environment I will distinguish between indicators that refer to specific qualities and indicators of 
overall quality.  
 
3.2       Specific qualities 
The living environment has many aspects, physical aspects, economic aspects and social aspect. 
Each of these aspects can be judged by several standards; for example, the social environment 
can be evaluated for the safety it provides, for the freedom it allows and for the fairness it 
achieves. As I cannot review all these matters, I will suffice with the example of 'social equality'. 
This aspect of objective wellbeing can be measured in the following ways. 
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Type 1 indicators 
Objective measurement of social inequality requires that impartial outsiders assess difference in 
access to scarce resources among members of a society. Typically this boils down to difference in 
income, which is assessed using national income statistics that draw on registrations of taxes and 
salaries. Other indicators of this kind involve difference in access to education or medical care in 
a country.   
 
Type 2 indicators 
Since income statistics have many limitations, the distribution of incomes in a country is also 
assessed by means of questionnaires. This brings subjective element into this otherwise objective 
assessment, especially when income is assessed by global questions. The Luxembourg income 
study is an example of this approach.  
 Another example of mixed measurement of social inequality is considering inequality in 
subjective outcomes of life. In that context, I have proposed to measure social inequality in 
nations by the dispersion of life-satisfaction in representative samples of the general population 
(Veenhoven 2003a). An advantage of that method is that it covers all relevant resources, and not 
just the few ones that are easily measurable and deemed relevant. Other advantages are that this 
indicator of social inequality is well comparable across time and nations. A disadvantage is that 
the causes of inequality remain in the dark.    
 
Type 3 indicators 
A purely subjective assessment of social inequality is asking people how much inequality they 
think there is in their country. An advantage of this approach is that such perceptions also reflect 
less palpable differences in access to scarce resources than just income. A disadvantage is that 
perceptions may be incorrect and that the public discussion about social inequality may influence 
the perception of this reality.   
 
3.3       Overall quality  
Likewise we can discern three ways to assess the overall quality of living conditions. 
 
Type 1 indicators 
The objective approach is adding together registration based indices of quality of living 
conditions. This is practiced in several indexes of wellbeing, such as Estes's (1984) ‘Index of 
Social Progress' and Slottje’s (1991) index of ‘quality of life’ in nations. Such indexes involve 
indicators of material affluence, safety in the streets, political stability, rule of law, 
unemployment, etc. Indexes of this kind are also used for local living conditions. An example is 
Liu’s (1977) index for quality of life in metropolitan areas.   
Though commonly used, this type of indicators is very questionable. One problem is that 
such indexes cannot cover all relevant issues, and that the weighing of items in these indexes is 
quite arbitrary. Another problem is that the relevant qualities of an environment depends to some 
extend on the capabilities of its inhabitants; living in a free society may be beneficial for well 
educated autonomous people, but possibly not for dumb conformists. I have discussed the 
limitations of these indexes in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1996, 2000).  
 
Type 2 indicators 
Several indicators combine such registration-based indices of quality of living conditions with 
subjective satisfaction with these conditions. An example is Rogerson’s (1997) measure of 
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quality-of-life in British counties. That measure considers ten environmental attributes, such as 
‘cost of living’, ‘pollution’ and ‘shopping facilities’ and then weights these qualities by public 
opinion about their importance.  
The overall quality of an environment can also be measured indirectly, by considering 
how well people thrive in it. When people flourish in an institution or in a country the quality of 
that environment is apparently sufficient, though not necessarily ideal. In that vein I have 
proposed to measure the livability of societies by the average happiness of its citizens 
(Veenhoven 1995, 2000). This is a mixed measure, since subjective information is used in an 
objective way; it is an interpretation of self reported happiness that goes beyond the individuals 
awareness, just like a doctors diagnosis add to the patients complaints.    
 
Type 3 indicators 
An example of a purely subjective assessment of the overall quality of one's environment is 
asking people to rate the quality of their town or country. This common practice in surveys on the 
'best place to live' and in questionnaire studies on the quality of life provided by institutions, such 
as the army or old age homes. This approach also avoids the preconceptions of type 1 measures. 
Yet a major disadvantage is again that perceptions may be false. People may be unaware of 
shortcomings of their living environment, due to misinformation or defensive denial.    
 
 4         INDICATORS OF ABILITY TO COPE WITH LIFE
This kind of wellbeing is depicted by the top-right quadrant in scheme 2. Life-ability can be 
thought of as entirely objective substance, someone being capable or not, independent of how 
capable one thinks one is. As such it can be measured again by indicators type 1, 2 and 32. Like 
in the case of the environment, we can again distinguish between indicators of specific 
capabilities and estimates of overall life-ability. In this context I will also make a distinction 
between indicators of the wellbeing of separate individuals and social indicators for the wellbeing 
of collectivities, such as citizens of a country.  
 
4.1      Specific capabilities 
Being 'well' in this sense involves many capabilities, both physical and mental. Good physical 
ability entails absence of obvious dysfunction in the first place, often referred to as 'health', but 
may also call for positive 'eu-functioning’, as exemplified in endurance or motor skill. Mental 
abilities concern intellectual capability, emotional control and various social skills, such as 
empathy and assertiveness. I will not try to review all the indicators of all capabilities, since this 
would cover the entire test-psychology. Let me suffice with the example of 'intelligence'. 
 
Type 1 indicators 
Intelligence can be measured objectively by means of 'tests' of performance in standardized tasks, 
mostly in a paper and pencil format. Intelligence tests entail samples of intellectual capabilities 
such as counting, memorization and verbal logic. Intelligence is also assessed by real life 
performance, such as by educational achievement and success at work.  
 These individual level indicators can be aggregated to the nation level. Average scores on 
intelligence tests are commonly compared across nations and over time. In a similar way, the 
level of literacy is used to assess this kind of wellbeing in nations. 
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Type 2 indicators 
Emotional intelligence is typically measured in another way. Since performance in emotional 
tasks is not well visible for an outsider common EQ-tests draw on self-ratings. Typical items are: 
"How well do you get along with your family?" and "Do you feel you understand what is going 
on in other people?” The objective element in these 'tests' is in the selection and weighing of 
items, which sometimes depends on their predictive power.  
 Average scores on such indicators can also be used to compare across social categories 
and nations and for trend analysis. To my knowledge this is not common practice. 
 
 
Type 3 indicators 
A purely subjective indicator of intelligence is a simple self-rating, for instance the answer to the 
question "Do you feel you are smarter than most people of your age? Much smarter, a bit smarter, 
about equal, a bit less, much less”.  
A common result with such measures is that most people think that they are better than 
average (Headey 1988). This sense of relative superiority is commonly attributed to self-serving 
bias, but it may also be due to under-estimation of others due to selective publicity. Whatever the 
reason, this pattern of response makes this kind of indicators less suitable for comparison across 
nations and through time.   
 
4.2      Overall life-ability 
Comprehensive capability cannot really be 'measured' but can to some extend be 'estimated'. This 
is done in the following ways.  
 
Type 1 indicators 
The objective way would seem to aggregate scores on tests of various capabilities. This approach 
can yield informative capabilities 'profiles' but not a meaningful sum-score. The same objections 
as brought in against indexes of environmental quality apply also in this case. Performances on 
different skills cannot meaningfully be summed and the capabilities life calls for depend on 
environmental demands.  
 In restricted settings, such as mental hospitals, one can also assess capability by 
behavioral observation. Trained observers or attendants then rate the patient's ability to deal with 
the problems of daily life. Various rating systems are used for this purpose. This method can 
work if required capabilities are fairly unequivocal, which is mostly the case in such settings.    
 
Type 2 indicators 
Such neutral estimates of life-ability are often completed with self-reports. This is common 
practice in psychological measurement, especially in estimates of overall ability. Since 
measurement involves mostly interviews it is difficult to ignore the subjects self-appraisal. 
 
Type 3 indicators 
A purely subjective measure is someone's self-estimate of capability. This is commonly measured 
by responses to questionnaire items on self-reliance and self-confidence. When such items figure 
in nation wide surveys, the mean can serve as an indication of the competence of the average 
citizen. 
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As noted, some conceptions of life-ability involve both objective and subjective elements. A 
good example is the concept of 'positive mental health' as described by Jahoda (1952). Objective 
elements in that capability syndrome are 'adequate perception of reality' and 'integration' of 
personality. Subjective features are 'self-confidence' and 'liking' of other people. This mixed 
concept can be measured using indicator types 4, 5 and 6. 
 5         INDICATORS OF WORTH FOR THE WORLD
Let me now consider the wellbeing concept denoted by the bottom-left quadrant in scheme 3. 
This view on wellbeing stresses the consequence of a life. This notion is not very prominent in 
the social policy discourse and therefore remained also marginal in social indicators research. It is 
a greater issue in the discussion about the meaning of life in philosophy and in existential 
psychology.  For the sake of completeness I will nevertheless review the possible indicators of 
this matter. 
Substantively, this kind of wellbeing is 'objective'. The concept is about the actual effects 
on the environment, not about illusions on that matter. So the possible indicators are again of the 
types 1, 2 and 3. Measurement is quite difficult in this case, since it is mostly difficult to get an 
idea about the effects a life, in particular effects on the wider environment. 
   
5.1      Aspects of worth 
The worth of a life for its environment can be judged in many ways. One can consider the long-
term effects on the eco-system and on society, or limit to short-term worth for one's business or 
family. I will illustrate this point with indicators of environmental damage, which emerged from 
current discussions about sustainable development. 
 
Type 1 indicators 
An objective measure of this objective substance is the 'ecological footstep', that is, the amount of 
non-renewable resources consumed. At the nation level this is typically estimated using statistical 
data about sales of materials. An example can be found in the Living Planet Report (WWF 2002). 
 
Type 2 indicators 
The ecological footstep can also be measured at the individual level, using questionnaires and 
consumption diaries. This objective matter is then measured with subjective data. These 
individual level scores can be aggregated to the nation level in principle, provided that these data 
can be raised in representative samples of the general population. 
 
Type 3 indicators  
Using up non-renewable resources is also estimated by simple self-ratings. Since this is difficult 
to judge I see little value in such ratings. 
 
5.2      Overall worth of life 
It is easier to think of overall worth of life than to actually strike a balance of effects. This notion 
is in fact hardly measurable. Still some attempts have been made. 
 
 
 
 
Ruut Veenhoven 8 Subjective measures of well-being
Type 1 indicators 
To my knowledge there have been no attempts to measure overall worth at the individual level by 
summing objectively measurable value to the world, such as good citizenship and cultural 
innovations. Yet such indicators are being used at the nation level. An example is Naroll’s (1984) 
estimates of national contribution to the progress of science and international piece.  
 
Type 2 indicators 
The worth of life has also been assessed using questions about perceived contributions of one’s 
life to several causes. Chamberlain and Zika (1988) review some of the questionnaires of that 
kind. Again the objective element in this method measurement is that the investigator selects the 
aspects of worth and determines the weights. It is difficult to ascertain whether these scales 
reflect perceived worth of life or satisfaction with that perception. 
 
Type 3 indicators 
The most subjective measure is asking people how useful they think that their life is all in all. Yet 
the problem with such questions is that people hardly know and that the responses are therefore 
likely to be guided by other cues, such as their enjoyment of life. 
 
 
6         INDICATORS OF SATISFACTION WITH LIFE
The bottom-right quadrant in scheme 3 denotes personal appreciation of life. That kind of 
wellbeing is substantially subjective. As such, the assessment methods 7, 8 and 9 from scheme 2 
apply. Below I will mention examples of each of these indicator types, again first for satisfaction 
with aspects of life and then for satisfaction with life-as-a-whole.  
 
6.1       Aspects of life 
Subjective appreciation can concern different domains of life, such as work, family or leisure. 
Satisfaction can also concern specific qualities of life, such as its comfort or its challenge. In fact 
people appraise life in numerous ways and often combine aspect appraisals in multifarious 
notions such as 'loneliness'. A good overview of domains and criteria is found with Andrews and 
Withey (1976). Here I suffice with the example of 'job-satisfaction'.  
 
Type 7 indicators 
Since job-satisfaction is a mental state it is not well observable for an outsider. Still job-
satisfaction can to some extend be inferred from objectively observable behaviors, such as 
strikes, job-hopping, absenteeism and productivity. These indicators are used at the individual 
level and for aggregates. An obvious weakness of this method is that behavior depends on more 
things than mere satisfaction. 
  
Type 8 indicators 
An example of mixed objective and subjective measurement is found in common job-satisfaction 
'scales'. These questionnaires asks about multiple aspects, such as perceived job-security, the 
quality of contacts with colleagues, difficulty of work tasks, days sick, interest in other jobs, etc. 
A current scale of that type is the Job Descriptive Index (Smith, Kendall and Hulin 1969). This 
kind of indicator draws on subjective information, but processes that information in an objective 
way, by computing a sum-score in some way.     
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Type 9 indicators 
The most subjective measure of job-satisfaction is simple self-reports, such as an answer to the 
question 'Taking everything into consideration, how do you feel about your job as a whole? 
(Warr et. al. 1979). 
 
 
6.2        Life-as-a-whole 
Subjective appreciation of one's life-as-a-whole is called 'life-satisfaction' or 'happiness'. This 
matter is also measured by indicators type 7, 8 and 9.  
  
Type 7 indicators 
Suicide is sometimes used as an objective indicator of life-satisfaction, both at the individual 
level and at the nation level. Life-satisfaction is also inferred from other behavioral indications of 
despair, such as alcoholism and political extremism.   
Many of such indicators are combined in Lynn’s index of distress in nations. That index 
sums incidence rates of the following rates: 1) consumption of stress related stimulants, such as 
tobacco, coffee and alcohol, 2) incidence of risky behaviors like accidents, crime and murder, 3) 
mental disorders as measured by hospitalization for psychosis, 4) deviant behavior like divorce 
and illegitimate birth and 5) despair as apparent in suicide (Lynn 1971, 1982) 
Elsewhere I have inspected the correlation of such conducts with self-reported life-
satisfaction and found that these are mostly weak (Veenhoven 1993: chapter 5)   
 
Type 8 indicators 
There are several kinds of mixed measures of life-satisfaction. One is inferring satisfaction from 
behavioral intentions, such as plans to leave the country or suicidal ideation. Such question are 
often part of wider happiness ‘tests’ which also involve items about things deemed related to 
happiness, such as having plans for the future, seeing meaning in life and thinking to be happier 
than average. A much-used questionnaire of -that kind is the Neugarten et. al. (1961) Life 
Satisfaction Index. That approach has several flaws. One is that such sum-scores lack clear 
conceptual meaning; it is often unclear whether such questionnaires tap happiness or broader 
notions such as ‘adjustment’ or ‘optimism’. A related weakness is that the things deemed related 
to life-satisfaction do not always go together with it. For instance, not all happy people make 
plans and are optimistic. Further such measures introduce contamination in correlational analysis; 
if goal-orientation is part of the happiness indicator one cannot investigate the relation between 
happiness and goal-orientation with that measure. 
 Another kind of mixed indicators departs from type 9 subjective self-reports of life-
satisfaction, and combines these with objective data. One example is my ‘Happiness Adjusted 
Life-Years‘. Analogous to “Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY’s), this measure combines 
subjective happiness with objective longevity (Veenhoven 1996). This measure can be used at the 
individual level as well as at the nation level. Another composite of this kind is ‘Equality 
Adjusted Happiness’, which is computed by dividing average life-satisfaction in a nation by the 
standard deviation (Veenhoven 2003a). This measure applies only at the societal level.  
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Type 9 indicators 
The most subjective way of measuring subjective satisfaction with life is simply asking people 
how much they enjoy their life as a whole. A common item used in the World Value Surveys is: 
 
‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life-as-a-whole now?’ 
1           2           3           4           5            6            7           8           9           10 
Dissatisfied        satisfied 
 
Such questions can be framed in several ways, using different keywords, time frames and 
response formats. The World Database of Happiness (2003) contains an ‘Item Bank’, which 
provides a good overview of the question ever used for this purpose 
 
7          INDICATORS OF OVERALL WELLBEING 
So much for the indicators of the separate wellbeing concepts delineated in scheme 3. Now about 
attempts to measure wider wellbeing. Following the fourfold classification in scheme 3 we can 
see that there are seven possible kinds of composites: one combination of the two top quadrants, 
one combination of the two bottom quadrants, four three-quadrant combinations and a 
combination of all four quadrants. It would lead too far to expand on all these combinations and 
their measurement variants. I will suffice with some examples and explain why we better not use 
any of these indexes. 
 
7.1      UNDP Human Development Index 
The most commonly used indicator in this field is the 'Human Development Index'. This index was 
developed for the United Nations Development Program which describes the progress in all 
countries of the world in its annual 'Human Development Reports' (UNDP 1990). The Human 
Development Index is the mayor yardstick used in these reports. The basic variant of this measure 
involves three items: 1) public wealth, measured by buying power per head, 2) education, as 
measured by literacy and schooling, and 3) life-expectancy at birth. Later variants of the HDI 
involve further items: a) gender-equality measured by the so-called 'Gender empowerment index’ 
which involves male-female ratios in literacy, school enrolment and income, and b) poverty 
measured by prevalence of premature death, functional illiteracy and income deficiencies. Note that 
we deal with scores drawn from national statistical aggregates instead of individual responses to 
questionnaires.  
 When placed in our fourfold matrix, this index can be seen to have three meanings. See 
scheme 4. Firstly, it is about living conditions, in the basic variant of material affluence in society, 
and in the additions also of social equality. These items belong in the top left quadrant. In the case of 
wealth it is acknowledged that this environmental merit is subject to diminishing utility, however 
this is not so with the equalities. Secondly, the HDI includes abilities. The education item belongs in 
the top right quadrant. Though a high level of education does not guarantee high social competence, 
it means that many citizens at least have basic knowledge. Lastly, the item 'life-expectancy' is an 
outcome variable and belongs in the bottom right quadrant. The bottom left quadrant remains empty.  
 The HDI is certainly a useful measure of 'catch-up', it indicates how well developing nations 
meet some attainments that are characteristic for the leading nations of this world. Yet the HDI is of 
little as a measure of overall wellbeing. Scheme 4 helps to see why. The HDI adds apples and 
oranges, chances for a good life (wealth and education) and added to outcomes (life expectancy), 
and outer qualities (wealth, equality) are added to an inner one (education). This simply makes no 
sense. The HDI is also not suited for monitoring progress in wellbeing in advanced nations, since its 
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items are subject to the law of diminishing utility. More is not always better. This is acknowledged 
in the case of wealth, but not in the cases of equality and education. We can have too much of social 
equality and schooling.  Further, life expectancy is of value only if life remains satisfying in old age, 
but the HDI does take the enjoyment of life into account. 
  
7.2       Allardt’s Welfare Index 
In his seminal study on comparative welfare Allardt (1976) measured wellbeing in Scandinavian 
nations by means of self-reports on the following matters: 1) income, 2) quality of housing, 3) 
political support, 4) social relations, 5) health, 6) education, 7) being irreplaceable, and 8) doing 
interesting things and 9) life-satisfaction. These indicators cover all the variants of wellbeing in 
scheme 3; indicators 1, 2, 3 and 4 concern quality of living conditions, indicators 5 and 6 concern 
life-abilities, indicator 7 pertains worth for the world and the indicators 8 and 9 are about 
personal appreciation of life. Allardt classified these indicators using his, now classic distinction, 
between 'having', 'loving’ and 'being'. This labeling was appealing at that time, because it expressed 
the rising conviction that welfare is more than just material wealth, and because it fitted modish 
notions drawn from humanistic psychology.  Though it is well known, the classification has not 
proven to be very useful. 
 These indicators can also be ordered in the fourfold matrix proposed here. See scheme 5. 
Most of the items belong in the left-top quadrant because they concern pre-conditions for a good life 
rather than good living as such, and because these chances are in the environment rather than in the 
individual. This is the case with income, housing, political support and social relations. Two further 
items also denote chances but these are internal capabilities. This is the health factor and level of 
education. These items are placed in the top-right quadrant of personal life-ability. The item 
'irreplaceable' belongs in the utility bottom left quadrant. It denotes a value of life to others. The last 
two items belong in the enjoyment bottom right quadrant. 'Doing interesting things' denotes 
appreciation of an aspect of life3, while life-satisfaction concerns appreciation of life as a whole. 
  
  
7.3       WHO Quality Of Life scale 
Recently, a similar indicator has been developed in the field of health related quality of life research. 
The WHOQOL scale is a questionnaire about self-perceived wellbeing during the last two weeks. 
The following domains are addressed: 1) physical health, 2) psychological health, 3) social relation 
ships and 4) environmental conditions. The questionnaire involves also an item on perceived overall 
quality of life. The full questionnaire involves 100 items, the short version 26 one (WHOQOL 
Group 1998).  
 The main themes are summarized in scheme 6. Though this scale is meant for individual 
level analysis in the first place, it is also used for comparing wellbeing across nations and also for 
that reason a lot of effort is invested in accurate translation. 
 
7.4      Why all these indexes fall short 
All these attempts to summate across quadrants in scheme 3 fall short. The main reason is that it 
involves adding apples with oranges. There is no sense in adding ‘chances’ and ‘outcomes’. This 
is like measuring public health in a country by adding the quality of sewage to number of days ill. 
No serious epidemiologist would do so since the question is rather how these phenomena relate. 
Policy makers must know what quality of sewage is required for reducing the number of days ill 
and the summation of these matters does not tell them.  
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Likewise, it makes no sense either to summate 'outer' environmental conditions and 'inner' 
capabilities. Such simple summations do not acknowledge the contingencies involved. The 
livability of outer conditions depends to a great extend on the inner capabilities of the people. If 
outer conditions are poor, inner capabilities must be strong, but in good external conditions lower 
capabilities may suffice for a good life. It is the 'fit' that matters, not the sum. The fit is also 
situation specific; modern urban environment calls for different capabilities than traditional 
agrarian society. Schooling is more fitting in the former condition than in the latter.     
All these indexes are also incomplete, because they are limited to a few aspects, typically 
issues that are on the political agenda and happen to be measurable. Most of the indexes give 
equal weight to all items, while it should be rather evident that the importance of aspects will 
vary and none acknowledges that weights vary with satiation and that they are contingent to 
situations and personal capabilities. I have analyzed these shortcomings in more detail elsewhere 
(Veenhoven 1996, 2000).  
 
 
7.5       Best indicator is Happy Life Years 
The most comprehensive measure of wellbeing is how long and happy people live. Though this 
latter measure covers only the bottom right quadrant in scheme 3, it is likely to reflect the top 
quadrants as well. When a person lives long and happily, the preconditions are apparently 
sufficient; both the environmental conditions and the persons coping abilities must surpass the 
minimum level. Moreover, the person’s capabilities (top right quadrant) apparently fit 
environmental demands (top left quadrant). Note that I do not proclaim long and happy living as 
the essence of wellbeing, what I claim is that it is the most comprehensive indicator of this multi 
facetted concept. 
The degree to which people live long and happy in a country can be measured by 
combining data on length of life from civil registration with data on satisfaction with life as 
assessed in surveys, with type 9 questions as mentioned above. A simple measure is to multiply 
life-expectancy with life-satisfaction on range 0-1. For example: in the USA in 1995 life 
expectancy at birth was 76,4 years and average life-satisfaction on a 1 to 10 scale 7,4. Hence the 
average American will enjoy 56,9 happy life years in that era (76,4 x 7,4/10). This method is 
described in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1996). 
This measure of how long and happy people live is called ‘Happy Life Expectancy’ and 
abbreviated as HLE. Analogous to Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY’s) we could also to 
‘Happiness Adjusted Life Years’ abbreviated as HALY’s. This measure was ranked top in a 
recent review of indicatord of quality-of-life in nations (Hagerty et.al. 2001) 
Data on Happy Life Years are now available for 67 nations in the 1990’s and the number 
of countries covered is rapidly expanding. Trend data are available for 10 nations, some of which 
cover some fifty years. These data are published on the World Database of Happiness and are 
regularly updated (www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness, select ‘Distribution in Nations’ and next 
click ‘Finding Reports’). 
A look at the data shows great variation across nations. Happy Life Expectancy is 
currently highest in Switzerland (63 years) and lowest in Moldavia (20,5 years). About 75% of 
the cross-national differences can be explained by ‘hard’ societal characteristics such as 
economic development, political freedom and rule of law (Veenhoven 1996). Comparison though 
time shows a steady increase in first world nations during the last decade. 
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There is of course much doubt about the value of subjective life-satisfaction and these misgivings 
apply also to this measure of Happy Life Years. It would need another chapter to discuss these 
qualms. Suffice to note that I have done that elsewhere (Veenhoven 1996a, 1996b) and showed 
that these philosophical fantasies have little ground in reality. One thing is that happiness cannot 
be disposed as false consciousness; happy people appear to be typically realistic and well 
informed (Veenhoven 2003b). Another point is that happiness is not the same as carefree living. 
Happiness can go with considerable hardship and even seems to require some challenge 
(Veenhoven 2003c). Neither does happiness require dictatorial control such as described in the 
novel 'Brave New World', since happiness appears to require autonomy (Veenhoven 2003b). I 
will touch on some further qualms about happiness in the next section.  
 
 
8          USE OF MEASURES OF SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING 
 
Defenders of the objective approach hold that social indicators serve to guide social policy and 
that social policy makers need information about 1) the actual state of social problems, and 2) the 
effects of attempts to solve these problems. This information should be of an indisputable nature, 
in other words 'objectively true', and this scientific truth should enable rational social 
engineering. In this view, subjective indicators will distort the technocratic policy process and 
will give a voice to the irrationalities that have always hampered scientific management.  
 This position is quite common in the field of social indicators. Several international 
agencies focus rule out subjective indicators (OECD 1999) or ignore them (UNPD 1999). The 
Swedish level of living tradition is quite critical about subjective indicators (Vogel 2002). Below 
I will take a closer look at the misgivings about subjective indicators and argue why social policy 
still needs subjective indicators and that objective indicators taken alone are inadequate. 
 
8.1       Qualms about subjective measures 
Scheme 1 helps to chart the doubts about subjective indicators. Misgivings about mental matters 
must be distinguished from misgivings about measurement by self-reports.  
 
8.1.1    Misgivings about mental matters 
It is commonly objected that matters of the mind are unstable, incomparable and unintelligible.   
It is argued that attitudinal phenomena vary over time and that this variation has little link 
with reality conditions. For instance, attitudes about safety in the streets could depend more on 
media hype than on actual incidence of robbery. In this view, subjective indicators cannot 
provide a steady policy compass and fail to protect policymakers against the whims of the day. 
It is also argued that the subjective appraisals cannot be compared between persons. One 
assertion is that different people use different criteria, so two persons stating they are 'very happy 
' could say so for different reasons. Another claim is that people have different scales in mind, 
and that people who report they are 'very happy' may in fact be equally as happy as someone who 
characterizes his life as 'fairly happy'. In economy this reasoning is known as the theorem of 
'incomparable utilities'. If true, this would mean that subjective appraisals cannot show whether 
one person (or social group) is better off that another, and hence that this kind of indicator is of 
little help in selecting those most in need of policy support.  
Likewise it argued that subjective appraisals could not be compared across cultures. The 
example of poverty is often given in this context. Notions of poverty, and hence definitions of 
oneself as poor, will differ greatly between rich and poor nations, and within nations between 
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upper and lower classes. This would mean for social policy that these kinds of indicators tell 
policy makers little about relative performance. 
A related objection is that the criteria used for these subjective appraisals are largely 
implicit. Though people know fairly well how satisfied, anxious or trustful they are, they 
typically know less well why they think this is so. The appraisal process is quite complex and 
partly unconscious; this creates at least an interpretation problem for social policy. The declining 
trust in government (Vile, 1999) is an illustrative case. Though the trend is fairly clear, at least in 
the US, the causes are not and hence neither the remedy.    
This all merges into the position that subjective valuation is in fact irrelevant. Satisfaction 
judgments in particular can depend too little in real quality of life and too much on fashionable 
beliefs and arbitrary comparison. In this view policy makers can better ignore appraisals of 
citizens, just like some doctors disregard their patients complaints. Instead policy makers should 
look to objective statistical information, like doctors who believe only laboratory tests.  
 
These objections indeed apply to some subjective indicators. There is good evidence that most of 
them apply to satisfaction with domains of life and in particular to satisfaction with income. 
Income satisfaction is indeed highly dependent on social comparison and hence largely unrelated 
to objective welfare (VanPraag 1993).  
Yet these objections do not apply to any subjective indicator and especially not to overall 
satisfaction with life as a whole. Unlike most domain satisfaction, life-satisfaction is not relative 
(Veenhoven 1991). This is because life-satisfaction judgements draw on affective information in 
the first place (how well one feels) and not on cognitive comparison with standards of a good life. 
Research findings have also shown that subjective life-satisfaction is strongly related with several 
indicators of objective welfare, especially at the nation level. Illusive happiness exists only in 
fiction  
 
8.1.2     Misgivings about measuring by self-reports 
Several objections concern matters of validity. It is doubted that self-reports tap the things we 
want to access, even if the aim is inner matters. Next there are qualms about reliability. Self-
reports are said to be imprecise and too vulnerable to distortions. Though much of this criticism is 
overdone, there is some truth in it.  
  
 
Validity doubts 
When objective matters are measured by self-report there is always the problem that survey 
questions may evoke responses to different matters than the investigator had in mind. Even with a 
seemingly clear-cut matter such as 'income', there are problems: is it personal income or family 
income, gross or net, should capital revenues and non-monetary income be included, etc. This 
problem is particularly noticeable for ill-defined concepts such as 'health' and 'social prestige'.  
When subjective substance is measured, a further problem is that people may not have 
thought much out in their mind. For instance, not everybody has a crystallized 'self-concept' or a 
clear 'class-conscience'. Even when the person has some idea, this is not always fully consciously 
understood. For example, racists often fail to acknowledge their own opinions and unhappy 
people may even seek comfort in defensive reversal and thus believe that they enjoy life. 
Again these problems vary with subject matter. Elsewhere I have reviewed the various 
qualms about the validity of self-reported happiness and inspected the empirical evidence for 
these claims. I found no evidence for specific distortions and good evidence for general 
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predictive validity. At the individual level happiness appears to be a strong predictor of longevity 
(stronger that smoking or not) and at the nation level research shows quite strong correlations 
with societal characteristics such as economic affluence and political democracy, which together 
explain about 75% of the variance in average happiness. (Veenhoven 1997).  
 
Reliability doubts 
Even when self-reports fit the subject matter, there is still the problem of precision. Self-reports 
are typically made on fixed response options, the number of which is mostly no greater than 10. 
Not only are these scales rather crude, but also the responses on them are also fickle. The same 
amount of satisfaction may be rated by one person using the number 6 and by another person 
using the number 7. Such random error is no great problem for average scores, but it greatly 
deflates correlations. Next there is the problem that responses may be distorted in a systematic 
way, such as by a tendency for respondents to conform to social desirability. There is some 
evidence that desirability bias inflates ratings of income and social prestige. Along side such 
cultural biases there may also be systematic distortions in interviewing, item sequence and 
response-formats.  
Also in this case the distortions are not the same for any subjective indicator. Research on 
happiness has demonstrated that self-reports are affected by mood of the moment and 
characteristics of the interviewer (Schwarz 1999). Yet in nation averages such random errors 
appear to balance out, given the high percentage of explained variance mentioned above. 
 
 
8.2       Uses of subjective indicators in policy process 
In spite of these weaknesses, subjective indicators are indispensable in social policy, both for 
assessing policy success and for selecting policy goals. Objective indicators alone do not provide 
sufficient information, especially not on the subject of wellbeing. 
 
 
8.2.1    Assessing policy success 
Success in some goals can be measured objectively. Improvement of housing conditions can be 
measured using the gain in square meters per person or improvement in education using 
student/teacher ratio. Yet such measures have their limitations, and in some cases additional 
subjective indicators are required.  
This is for instance the case with public 'health'. Considerable problems exist regarding 
assessment of average health based on medical consumption and registered incidence of disease. 
Longevity does not fully capture the phenomenon either, and the effect appears only in the long 
term. Therefore all developed nations run health-surveys to gather data on subjective health 
complaints and reports of general feelings of health. Likewise, reduction of xenophobia manifests 
only partly in objective indicators such as racist attacks and interethnic marriage. Attitudinal data 
are needed to complete the picture. 
Success in social policy depends typically on public support. Without public backing most 
programs perish in the long run, even if planned goals are reached. Public opinion is not always 
fully expressed in the political process; hence polls are needed for additional information. Survey 
data are particularly needed for issues that are not on the political agenda and for groups that are 
ill represented.      
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8.2.2    Selecting policy goals 
Social policy makers also need information to enable them to decide on future directions. 
Political entrepreneurs must have an idea of what people want to mobilize the necessary support. 
They must also get in view what people really need, to select the most meaningful objectives. 
Much of this information requires subjective indicators to be obtained. 
When deciding on new directions, policy makers meet time and again with the problem 
that the political process does not always reflect public preferences adequately. Representatives 
sometimes fail to pick up latent concerns and vested interests often keep appealing issues from 
the political agenda. Good political marketing therefore requires additional public opinion 
research, in particular polls on worries, aspirations and satisfactions. These indicators are 
subjective in both substance and measurement. This kind of research is common practice in all 
developed democracies. 
Policymakers also operate in a more technocrat way and try to grasp what people really 
need. Here the problem is that expressed wants do not always reflect true needs. A good example 
is the case of materialist aspirations in affluent society. The western public wants ever more 
money and consumption, and this demand is served well by politicians. Yet in spite of the 
stunning rise in the material level of living, people keep asking for more, even though average 
happiness has remained about at the same level. According to Frank (1999) this is because our 
material needs are already satiated. In his view, the constant craving for more luxury draws on an 
underlying need for supremacy, which could be equally well met in less wasteful ways. Lane 
(2000) likewise has observed in a decline in happiness in modern market economies, which he 
attributes to the institutional neglect of social needs. 
In this example the gratification of needs in a population is measured by happiness, that is 
at the very most a subjective indicator. Elsewhere I have argued that overall happiness is indeed 
the best available indicator of the degree to which true needs are met, especially if combined with 
the number of years lived (Veenhoven 1995, 2000).    
 
8.2.3    Why objective indicators fall short 
The need for subjective indicators must also be judged against the limitations of objective 
indicators.  Objective indicators provide only a part of the required information and give 
generally a better view on details than on the whole. Hence categorical rejection of subjective 
indicators leaves the policy maker with an information deficit, which is inevitably replenished 
with private observations and hearsay.  
 
Limits to observation 
We have already noted above that social policy is not only concerned with objective matters such 
as 'income' and 'sanitation', but also with subjective wellbeing. Hence in the policy mix there is 
always a combination of objective and subjective substance. 
 We have also seen that objective measurement falls short on a lot of issues, not only in 
attitudinal matters but also in the assessment of objective substance. Remember that even the 
objective measurement of income is problematic. Objective measures also have limited validity 
and reliability. Joint use of objective and subjective measures is mostly helpful to get a complete 
picture, while rigid restriction to objective indicators considerably narrows the perspective.  
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Limits to aggregation 
Though objective counts are often quite useful for assessing detail, they are typically less helpful 
in charting the whole. For example, in assessing the quality of housing, objective indicators can 
help a great deal in quantifying aspects such as space, light and sanitation, but these aspects 
scores do not simply add into a meaningful overall estimate of dwelling quality. There have been 
many attempts to combine piecemeal objective observations into a comprehensive index, but all 
these attempts labor the same problems of incomplete information and arbitrary weights. 
Aggregation is less problematic with subjective indicators, because we can simply ask 
people about their overall judgment. Research has shown that people are quite able to strike a 
balance, both in life-domains such as housing and for their life-as-whole. Subjective appraisals 
have sometimes been used to assign weights to items in objective sum-scores, mostly avowed 
value priorities and sometimes-observed correlations with satisfaction. In fact that is a testimonial 
paupertatis. Rather than use subjective appraisals to construct a comprehensive index, one can 
better ask right away for an overall judgment.  
 
 
 
8.2.6   Use in developing countries  
The use of subjective measures of wellbeing limits largely to developed nations, where periodical 
social surveys are common practice. In the developing nations, social indicators research lodges 
in the objectivist tradition. In addition to the above-mentioned arguments for using subjective 
indicators, there are three further reasons why that approach is particularly advisable for 
developing nations. 
  The first additional reason is that information about subjective wellbeing is simply 
lacking in most developing nations. For all nations we know average income and the number of 
physicians per head, but for most we do not know how happy citizens are. That marks not only an 
information deficit for these nations, but also limits the comparative study of subjective 
wellbeing. 
The second reason is that political interest representation falls short in many developing 
countries. In that context, survey data on aspirations, needs and satisfactions of citizens are the 
more required. 
 The third reason is in the quality of registration in developing countries. Since that quality 
is often poor, the derived objective indicators also are. Hence survey data are the more needed for 
obtaining an adequate picture of reality. 
 Lastly, surveys are relatively cheap in developing nations and the quality of survey data 
can better be controlled. 
 
Together this means that there would be great value in a periodical social survey in developing 
countries. Such a survey could link up with the common ‘Euro Module’ that is now part of many 
welfare surveys in Europe (Zapf 2002). 
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9          CONCLUSION 
 
Social indicators cannot be classified as either ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’, since there are many 
gradations. Neither can one measure ‘wellbeing’ in the main, because that term denotes different 
matters that cannot be meaningfully summated. The most subjective measures of subjective 
wellbeing are self-reports of satisfaction, and the most comprehensive measure of that kind is 
satisfaction with life-as-a-whole, shortly called 'life-satisfaction' or 'happiness'. Subjective 
enjoyment of life can be meaningfully combined with objective length of life and expressed in 
the number of 'Happy Life Years' Since this outcome depends on the fit between environmental 
conditions and personal capabilities, it is also the best indicator of overall wellbeing.  
Information about perceptions and satisfactions of citizens is quite useful in the policy 
process, and the degree to which citizens live long and happy is an important criterion for final 
policy effectiveness. Data on that matter should also be made available for developing nations by 
introducing periodical welfare surveys. 
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Scheme 1 
 Objective-subjective difference: basic configurations 
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Source: Veenhoven 2002  
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Scheme 2 
Objective-subjective differences; elaborate configurations 
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The following indicators of health can exemplify this classification. 
  
Type 1: Illness revealed by symptoms such as weight loss or biochemical tests  
 
Type 2: Illness diagnosed by a doctor on the basis of a patient’s complaints. 
  
Type 3: Perception of being ill by one-self (possibly without feeling sick) 
  
Type 4: Being and feeling ill as apparent in sickness behaviors such as absenteeism  
and doctor visits   
 
Type 5: Being and feeling ill measured by a health questionnaire that involves  
both perceptions of functional health and health complaints 
 
Type 6: Being and feeling ill as reported directly by a person 
 
Type 7: Feeling ill as apparent in consumption of relief drugs, such as painkillers 
 or tranquilizers 
 
Type 8: Feeling ill measured by a sickness complaint inventory 
 
Type 9: Feeling ill measured by response to a single question on how fit or sick one feels  
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Scheme 3  
Four kinds of being 'well' 
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Source: Veenhoven 2000 
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Scheme 4 
Meanings measured by the  'Human Development Index' 
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Scheme 5 
Meanings measured by Allardt's 'Dimensions of Welfare': having, loving, and being 
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Scheme 6  
Meanings measured by the WHO's 'Quality of Life' scale 
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NOTES 
 1
     There are three main meanings or health: The maxi variant is all the good (WHO definition), the medium  variant 
    is life-ability, and the mini-variant is absence of physical defect 
 2
     One can also think of life-ability as involving some self-confidence. In that case we deal with a substantially mixed 
    concept that can be measured using indicators type 4, 5 and 6. 
 3 'Doing interesting things' can also be seen as a quality in itself, especially when the person does not like it. In this 
    interpretation this item should be placed in the meaning quadrant, because it represents some kind of perfection. 
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